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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
\ 
RANDY DIMMITT, 1 
vs. 
Case No. 
Plaintiff and Appellant, I 
MAURICE C. JONES and J. PAT- / 11137 
TON NEELEY, Judges of the City ) 
Court of Salt Lake City; and the 
CITY COURT OF SALT LAKE 
CITY 
' Defendants and Respondents. 
RESPONDENTS' .BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE 
OF THE CASE 
'l'he appellant filed a petition for Writ of Prohibi-
tion against the above named judges and City Court 
of Salt Lake City to enjoin that court from hearing a 
case involving traffic violations charged against the 
appellant juvenile. The appellant contends that the 
1 
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juveni~e courts of this state have exclusive jurisdiction 
over. him by virtue of the Juvenile Act of 1965, Afttr I 
hearmg arguments of both sides, the Honorable Br\'aui 
II. Croft, Judge in the Third Judicial District Court 
in and for Salt Lake County, held that defendant : 
court had concurrent j1-1risdiction over juveniles wit11 
were charged with traffic violations and dismissed ap 
pellant's request for Writ of Prohibition. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent is substantially in agreement with ilit 
statement of facts as listed in appellant's brief. 
ARGUMENT 
' 
POINT I I 
THE JUVENILE COUHT IS A SPECIAL 
COURT AND ITS JURISDICTION MUST EE 
STRICTLY CONSTRUED. 
As stated in 20 Am. J ur. 2d Courts, Section :11. 
juwnile courts are special courts. The jurisdiction o: 
special courts must be expressly stated in the Jegislatirt 
enactment inasmuch as they carve out their jurisdictio:i 
from courts of general jurisdiction. Therefore, in \n, 
case presently before the court, if there is any duLlf 
as to the power of the juvenile court over the person:':' 1 
offenses, this doubt must be resolved in favor of a fino j 
2 . 
l 
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ing of concurring jurisdiction by courts of general 
jurisdiction. Anderson vs. Anderson, 18 Utah 2d 89, 
416 P2d. 308 ( 1966). 
POINT II 
THE CITY COURT HAS CONCURRENT 
JURISDICTION OVER TRAFFIC OFFEND-
ERS \VHO ARE UNDER THE AGE OF 18. 
The Juvenile Court Law of 1965 gave jurisdiction 
to the juvenile court over minors under the age of 18 
who violated local or city ordinances. The respondents, 
in these proceedings, contend that the city courts have 
concurrent jurisdiction with the juvenile courts over 
traffic offenders who are under the age of 18. A close 
reading of the Juvenile Court Law presently in effect 
in this state will readily impress the reader that traffic 
offenders are treated completely different from those 
inrnlved in any other violation. The traffic off ender is, 
in fact, convicted of a crime by the juvenile court, while 
other violations are treated as civil matters and the 
court invokes equity in handling those matters, (section 
55-10-105) U.C.A. 1953 It is clear that the procedures 
covering traffic cases in the Juvenile Code are entirely 
different from all other alleged violations, (section 55-
10-96). A traffic violation is the only alleged offense to 
which a petition need not be filed to commence the ac-
tion (section 55-10-83 ( 3) ) . The records of a traffic vio-
lation are the only records that may be used in any other 
3 
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court as evidence against the juvenile in his later life 
(section 55-10-105 ( 2) ) , and the same records may t; 
filed with the State Department of Public Safety and 
1 
used by them as a basis for the suspension of a driver') ' 
license, (section 55-10-105 ( 5) ) . The reasonable conclu. ! 
sion from these numerous exceptions covering traffic : 
violations is that the Legislature intended the city court 
to have concurrent jurisdiction in prosecution of minor) 
under its traffic code. It is apparent from section 5j. 1 
I 
10-105, U.C.A. as amended, that the Legisature did i 
not, in fact, intend that the juvenile court should have 
1 
exclusive jurisdiction over traffic offenders under the I 
I 
age of 18. We quote said section: 
"55-10-105. Children's cases deemed civil pro· 
ceedings-Adjudication of jurisdiction by juve-
nile court not conviction of crime, exception -
Record and evidence inadmissible in other pro· 
ceedings, exception-Child not to be charged 
with crime, exception-Traffic violation cases, I 
abstracts to department of public saf ety.-(11 
Proceedings in children's cases shall be rega:~ed , 
as civil proceedings, with the court exerc1smg 
equitable powers. 
"(2) An adjudication by a juvenile court t~at 
a child is within its jurisdiction under section 
55-10-77 shall not be deemed a conviction of 
a crime, except in cases involving traffic vi~la· 
tions · no such adjudication shall operate to llJ1· 
pose 'any civil disabilities up~n. the c~ild nor.1.'. 
disqualify the child for any civil service or mill i 
tary service or appointment. I 
. d . h · ·1 court " ( 3) Neither the recor m. t e J.uvem e h ll 
nor any evidence given in the JUvemle courts a 
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, I . : 
be admissible as evidence against the child in any 
other court, with the exception of cases involving 
traffic violations. 
" ( 4) No child shall be charged with crime nor 
be convicted in any court except as provided in 
section 55-10-86 and in cases involving 'traffic 
violations. When a petition has been filed in the 
juvenile court, the child shall not thereafter be 
subjected to criminal prosecution based on t.b.e 
same facts except as provided in section 55-10-86. 
" ( 5) Abstracts of court records for adjudica-
tions of traffic violations shall be submitted to 
the department of public safety as provided in 
sections 41-2-17, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
amended 'by chapter 84, Laws of Utah 1961." 
Subsection I of the above requires that all proceedings 
will be civil proceedings with the court exercising equit-
able powers. Subsection 2 provides that an adjudication 
by the juvenile court is not a crime, except In cases 
involving traffic violations. Subsection 3 excepts traffic 
1
) I violations from the effect of its provisions. Subsection 
a , 4 certainly establishes by express language that no 
child may be charged with or convicted of a crime 
in any other court except in two areas : ( 1) where 
the juvenile is charged with the commission of a felony 
and the juvenile court certifies that child to the district 
1• court to be treated as an adult and tried under the 
1· Code of Criminal Procedures; and (2) in cases involv-
tn ing traffic violations. 
J.. 
The first sentence of subsection 4 reads "no child 
rt shall be charged with crime nor be convicted in any 
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cases involving traffic violations." If the Legislature 
intended the act to read as appellant contends, lht 
above phrase in any court would have been eliminated. 
By the use of the phrase in any court the Legislature 
intended that other courts have concurrent power tu 
try juvenile traffic violators. 
The secend sentence of subsection 4 sets up the 
ground rules as between courts of general jurisdiction 
and the juvenile court involving traffic violations a5 
to which court shall handle the matter if filed in both. 
It could not apply to alleged violations of felonies or II 
juveniles as the procedures covering those matters are 
dictated by section 86. When the petition or matter 
has been filed in the juvenile court, then that court 
processes the matter to its conclusion and the defendanl 
is not burdened with also having to appear before an· 
other court in the case. Inasmuch as all other violatiom 
of local ordinances or state laws committed by a minor 
must be filed in the juvenile court, the legislative com· 
mand as found in subsection 4 is without meaning unless 
respondent's contention of concurrent jurisdiction ~ 
accepted as to traffic violations. 
This court has on many occasions adhered. to '.n1 I 
general rule of statutory construction that a leg1slatire I 
enactment be literally construed. We quote from 001 I 
of the most recent: . 
"The enactment of the statute prescribini I' 
this procedure is the legislative prer~g~tive.J'~I 
carries with it the presumptions that it is va 10 
and that the words and phrases were chosen a· 
6 
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visely to express the legislative intent. The 
statute should not be stricken down nor applied 
other than in accordance with its literal wording 
unless it is so unclear or confused as to be wholly 
beyond reason, or inoperable, or it contravenes 
some basic constitutional right." (emphasis add-
ed) Gord vs. Salt Lake City, .... Utah.2d .... , 
434 P.2d 449, (1967.) 
To accept plaintiff's position would be to totally ignore 
the above rule as it applies to subsection 4. The phrase 
" in any court" and the instructions in the second 
sentence when literally construed and applied can lead 
to no other conclusion and procedure than that advo-
cated by respondents, that other courts have concurrent 
jurisdiction over minors charged with traffic violations. 
It has been argued by appellants that section 55-
10-79 requires a judge of all other courts to refer all 
defendants under the age of 18 to the juvenile court. 
One must realize that this requirement is dependent 
upon the juvenile court having exclusive jurisdiction 
orer the alleged offense. In the case before us, an ex-
ception to that exclusive jurisdiction has been carved out 
by section 55-10-105, subsection 4. 
It is not the position of respondents in this case 
that city courts have jurisdiction over juveniles charged 
with a misdemeanor in matters other than those involv-
ing traffic violations. The specific argument being that 
the Legislature exempted this one area from the ex-
clusive jurisdiction of the juvenile court. 
7 
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POINT III 
THE EXPRESSED INTENTION 01•' THE 
LEGISLATURE IN ENACTING THE 19oj 
JUVENILE ACT WAS TO PROVIDE PRO. 
TECTION AND ASSISTANCE FOR THl 
NEGLECTED AND ANTI-SOCIAL JU\'E. 
NILE NOT THE TRAFFIC ~F~:ENDER I 
Quotn1g from section 55-10-63, it is the purpose I 
of this act to secure for each child coming before tne 
juvenile court ... guidance and discipline require~ 
to assist him to develop into a responsible citizen, to 
improve the condition and home environment respon· 
sible for his delinquency; and, at the same time to pro· 
tect the community and those individual citizens from 
juvenile violence and juvenile law breaking." Tht 
normal traffic offender, be he an adult or minor, it 
not normally rebelling against society and exhibitini 
violence and intentional law breaking. These violatiom 
generally result from negligence in the operation oi 
the vehicle. This, respondents are sure, was realized h~· 
the State Legislature and is the purpose behind the 
numerous exceptions written into the law concernin1 
traffic violations. This court in considering the juri)· 
diction and purpose of the juvenile court found a) 
follows: 
1 
"Section 77 deals with the authority of ~fie 
juvenile court to act in proceedings concernm; i 
children who are neglected, dependent, o~ v.h ; 
for reasons pertaining to anti-social behav1~r ~'. ! 
family status require investigation and a~u~a I 
cation." Anderson vs. Anderson, 18 Uta · : 
89, 416 P.2d 308. 
8 
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Respondents admit that there are certain drivers 
who are grossly irresponsible toward society and in 
the case of minor drivers so situated, it is entirely proper 
that they be treated in a different manner than the 
regular responsible operator of a motor vehicle. This 
is one of the reasons that the Legislature included 
traffic violations within the Juvenile Court Code. It 
is completely within the common understanding of 
traffic court judges, town magistrates, and justices of 
the peace that should these special violators come before 
the court, they may be referred to the juvenile court 
' for assistance and rehabilitation. 
The privilege to drive is granted by the State to 
members of society who have reached a certain level of 
ability to operate a motor vehicle. There is no right 
to this license for this privilege must be earned by proof 
of performance and will be continued in effect only so 
long as the licensed operator stays within the frame-
work of the rules and regulations pertaining to the 
operation of a motor vehicle. The minor under the age 
of 18 is no differently situated when operating a motor 
rehicle than is an adult, be he 21 or 91, and justice 
would demand that he be treated in exactly the same 
manner as his elder counterpart. As indicated in 
Anderson vs. Anderson, supra, the purpose of the 
jurenile act is to assist those minors who are neglected 
or who show anti-social behavior. To consider exceed-
ing the speed limit by five miles an hour or committing 
1 
some other common violation to be exhibiting anti-
social behavior is absurd. 
9 
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It is recognized by respondents that a contin 
1 
I 
ua, I showing by a minor of disregard for traffic laws wou]~ 
indicate that that minor was neglected or showing anti. 'j 
social behavior and, therefore, would need additional. 
help and counseling. The same principle is realized 01 ! 
the traffic courts of this state in cases concerning aduit1 l 
where constar1t violators are required to attend special 
classes which attempt to teach them the responsibilitr 
required of the driver and the proper operation of~ 
motor vehicle. I 
It is for the above reasons that the Legislature' 
established concurrent jurisdiction in the city courb ! 
and the juvenile courts for the handling of traffic rio· 
lators under the age of 18. The respondent court, ana 
its associated traffic violation bureau, by computer. I 
keep records of all traffic violations. The driver license 
division of the State of Utah maintains a file on eacn 
1 
driver licensed by the State and a record of all traffic 
violations for quick reference. In the respondent cit~· 
court, a viola tor who is cited for the second time within 
a year may not simply post bond and forfeit the bail I 
These persons whether they be young or old mml I 
. I 
appear before the judge for plea, trial and sentencmg. 
Under these circumstances, the violator normally musi 
pay a higher fine and attend eight hours of instruction 
in the traffic school taught on the campus of the Uni· 1 
versity of Utah. It is, therefore, only reasonable tha'. ! 
in the case of the juvenile drivers who receive a secona I 
ticket within a prescribed period of time that they be I 
referred to the juvenile court for proper counseling 
1 
10 I 
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and assistance. This procedure would greatly help 
the juvenile court in carrying out its duty of re-
iiabilitating delinquent minors. Instead of receiving 
a great mass of violators for automatic processing, the 
court would only receive those who were irresponsible 
or showing anti-social behavior thus allowing the per-
sonnel of the court to spend considerable time and effort 
in helping these individuals. 
CONCLUSION 
The Legislature intended that traffic violations 
committed by persons under 18 be handled by the juve-
nile court and by other courts of competent jurisdic-
tion. The distinction is made between such offense and 
all other alleged violations because the Legislature 
"otherwise provided by law." 
Traffic violations are the only offenses which upon 
adjudication shall be d~emed the conviction of a crime 
: I Sec. 55-10-105 ( 2) ) by a minor. No other viola ti on 
li1 the juvenile court retains that stigma. 
The trial court was well advised when he made the 
following ruling in his memorandum decision: 
"Section 105 ( 4) is, in my opinion, another 
statement relating to exclusive jurisdiction of 
the juvenile court. It is a specific statement that 
no child shall be either charged with, or convicted 
of, crime in any court except in ( 1) felony cases 
certified under Section 86 and ( 2) cases involv-
ing traffic violatoins. Had the legislature intend-
ed that traffic violations must be handled exclu-
11 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
s~vely by the juvenile court _,this second exce~­
bon woul~ ~ever. have _been I?cluded in 105(4
1 
In my op1mon, mcludmg this exception in 10· 
is a clear demonstration that the legislature i
11
'. I 
tended that cases involving traffic violations 01 I 
persons under 18 could be brought, and convic· f 
tions obtained in courts other than the juvenile 
court." I 
After a close reading of the entire Juvenile Court I 
Act of 1965, one will readily conclude that traffic 01. 
fender~ are to be treated in a class by themselves. Tne 
Legislature did not intend "exclusive jurisdiction" tn 
these cases. I 
Because the juvenile court is a special court, iG 
jurisdiction must be very strictly construed. If there 
be any doubt, then that doubt must be resolved agaimt 
"exclusive jurisdiction." 
The decision of the trial court was made after care· 
ful consideration and is correct. That decision shoula 
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...__ __ 
Delivered five (5) copies of respondent's brief to Ronald 
N. Boyce, Attorney for appellant, at the offices of Salt Lake 
county Bar Legal Services, Inc., 431 South 3rd East, Salt Lake 
City, Utah, this 29th day of March, 1968 • 
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